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Abstract 
In this paper we use a general model of imperfect competition to predict welfare 
changes within an open-access fishery after it transitions to individual transferable quota 
(¡TQ) management. Although related research has explored the effects of market power 
in the harvesting sector on ÍTQ performance, none has considered the implications of 
an imperfectly competitive processing sector. Addressing this question, we find that 
although fishermen should expect to gain from ITQs under perfect competition, they 
may suffer welfare losses if the processing sector is imperfectly competitive.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Tradable property rights systems are increasingly considered by fisheries regulators as 
the most promising solution to the problems that often accompany open-access 
resource use. The potential efficiency gains from tradable property rights over the more 
traditional command-and-control style regulations, given that all the strict assumptions 
are satisfied, are well documented in both the theoretical and empirical literature 
(Moloney and Pearse 1979; Weninger 1998; Grafton, Squires,, and Fox 2000; Weninger 
et al. 2003). By introducing individual transferable quotas (ITQs) into a perfectly 
competitive fishery in which (1) fishermen have complete information, (2) they can 
interact in the permit market with zero transactions costs, and (3) the initial distribution 
of quotas does not affect the marginal valuation of the resource, the fishery is expected 
to realize an efficient distribution of fishing effort. 
 
In tandem with the predicted efficiency gains, recent research has emphasized that 
fishermen, in aggregate, may achieve welfare increases as a result of ITQ management 
(Terrebonne 1995; Matulichatid Sever 1999; Heaps 2003; Boyce 2004). However, these 
potential welfare gains depend critically on the assumption that all sectors of the fishing 
industry are perfectly competitive and that consumers' demand is elastic. Case studies 
of fisheries in which these assumptions do not accurately describe the industry are 
ubiquitous (for a review see National Research Council 1999). 
 
In contrast, the economics literature lacks research examining the impact of imperfect 
competition in the fishing industry. Love (1995) uses data from the Pacific halibut 
industry to test for the existence of market power in the processing sector and finds that 
the degree of monopsony power varies inversely with the length of the fishing season. 
Clark and Munro (1980) model the welfare impacts of a monopsonistic processor in a 
fishery, but they do not consider varying degrees of market power or the effect of ITQ 
management on welfare measures. A couple of studies analyze how monopoly power in 
the harvesting sector (fishermen amassing large percentages of quotas) may alter the 
environmental and economic performance of ITQs (Anderson 1991; Adclaja, Menzo, 
and McCay 1998). Matulich, Mittelhammer, and Reberte (1996) explore the welfare 
losses to processors with nonmalleable capital investments under an ITQ regime. 
However, no study specifically addresses the problem of introducing a property rights 
system in a fishery with a less than competitive processing sector. 
 
This paper fills this gap in the literature by developing a flexible model of imperfect 
competition for analyzing the long-run effects of ITQ management on fishermen's 
welfare in the presence of an imperfectly competitive processing sector. The analysis is 
developed in the context of the Atlantic herring fishery but may be generalized lo 
any fishery exhibiting similar industry structure. 
 
Predicting how policy-induced welfare measures change when relaxing the assumption 
of a perfectly competitive industry is critical for analyzing many fisheries as well as 
multitiered agricultural product markets in general (Sexton 2000; McCorriston 2002). 
Related agricultural market studies show that the existence of oligopsonyoligopoly 
power in the processing of foods can affect the size and distribution of welfare changes 
from technological innovation (Chen and Lent 1992; Dryburgh and Doyle 1995; Huang 
and Sexton 1996; Alston. Sexton, and Zhang 1997, 1999; Hamilton and Sunding 1997). 
In general, if regulators falsely assume that an industry is behaving perfectly 
competitively, the predicted consequences of prescribed policies are likely to be 
misleading. 
 
 
II. Background on Atlantic Herring Existing Regulation and the Need for Further 
Action 
 
The Atlantic herring fishery is on the verge of implementing property-rights-  
 
 
FIGURE 1 
Management Area in the Atlantic Herring Fishery 
 
based management. Since January 2000, the Atlantic herring fishery has been 
managed under a federal fisheries management plan developed jointly by the New 
England Fisheries Management Council (NEFMC) and the Atlantic States Marine 
Fisheries Commission (ASMFC).' The fishery is divided into four management areas 
(Figure 1), and the primary management tool is a cap on aggregate harvest and 
harvests within each area (the total allowable catch [TAC]) (NEFMC 1999). 
 
The fishery essentially remains open access because existing regulations do not limit 
the number of participants. Like other fisheries that restrict aggregate harvest levels 
without restricting effort levels, an unbounded number of fishermen race for an 
unspecified portion of the herring TAC. This type of derby fishing promotes inefficiencies 
and potentially limits the length of the fishing season, which can disrupt herring supplies 
and jeopardize the overall stability of the industry (Gordon 1954; NEFMC 2005). 
 
In response to these concerns, NEFMC and ASMFC have developed the first  
 
TABLE I 
Percentage of Total Allowable Catch (TAC) by Management Area for 2000-2004 
 
 
amendment to the 2000 management plan to "prevent excess capacity in the harvesting 
sector" and to "minimize, to the extent practicable, the race to fish for Atlantic herring in 
all management areas" (NEFMC 2005, 11-12). To address these broad goals, there is a 
provision within the amendment to allow an ITQ system to be implemented in the future 
through a streamlined public review process. 
 
In aggregate, the statistics available on the status of the commercial herring fishery 
suggest little cause for immediate management action. Total harvests during 2000 to 
2004 have averaged roughly only 55'^ of the fishery-wide TAC, and the herring biomass 
as a whole has been increasing over recent years.'' However, a different picture 
develops when describing the individual fishery management areas. Effort is not 
dispersed evenly throughout the four management areas, with the inshore area 1A 
having exhausted 100% of its quota in four of the five years between 2000 and 2004 
(Table 1). Inshore area IB has also witnessed high harvest levels relative to the two 
offshore management areas, exhausting its allotted annual quota twice between 2000 
and 2004. As is common in open-access fisheries with a constraint on aggregate 
harvest, the herring fishery has significant levels of excess capacity (Brandt and 
McEvoy 2006). Thus, fishermen and management continue to voice concern about the 
existing race to fish and the resulting inefficiencies. 
 
Another source of concern is the increase in harvesting pressures in response to 
changes in the American lobster industry. As the primary source of bait for American 
lobstermen, the herring fishery allocates roughly 60% of its annual harvest to lobster 
bait. Lobsters have long remained the most lucrative commercial fishery on the eastern 
coast of the United States, earning annual revenues averaging over S300 million in the 
past five years. Although lobster harvest rates have remained relatively stable since 
2000, in 2004 the fishery witnessed a ITA increase in the annual catch (roughly 40.000 
metric tons) (NOAA 2006). The 2004 harvest, the largest since 1999, was partially 
driven by developments in information and shipping technologies that have enabled the 
fishery to meet demands outside of New England. New shipping products such as the 
"Habitat Packing Solution" allow live lobsters to be shipped virtually anywhere in the 
world at reasonable costs (Hast Coast Seafood Company 2006). 
 
A future swift increase in the demand for herring as lobster bait could exacerbate the 
already inefficient race to the fish in areas lA and IB, where the majority of herring sold 
as bait is harvested. Although a portion of the predicted increase in effort could take 
place in the offshore areas, the added costs of transport and refrigeration tied to 
harvesting bait in these areas would likely limit such a movement. Consequently, 
incentives would be created for additional capital to enter the industry, fueling the 
existing problem of excess capacity. Regulatory action to alleviate the problems 
associated with derby-style fishing is thus seen as imperative. 
 
ITQ Management in the Atlantic Herring Fishery and the Concern for Market Power 
 
Although an individual property rights system has been submitted under Amendment 1, 
not all stakeholders are supportive of this type of regulation. Processors voice concern 
about a drastic change in the flow of herring supply due to a change in the fishing 
season and its effect on their processing capacity." Herring fishermen disagree on how 
and to whom ITQs should be allocated, and many fear manipulation of the ITQ market 
by those with large holdings. Fishermen may have yet another reason for remaining 
skeptical concerning ITQ management-processors, market power--and it is this concern 
that motivates our analysis. 
 
As mentioned previously, well over half of the total herring harvest is sold as bait to 
American lobster fishermen. In Maine, the state that consistently accounts for roughly 
75% of annual lobster harvests, herring has long remained the bait preferred by 
lobstermen (NOAA 2006). The majority of herring processed as bait is channeled  
 
TABLE 2 
Volume and Percentage of Herring Sold to Bait Dealers for the Largest Four Bait Dealers in 2003 
 
 
through a handful of large wholesalers who then sell to smaller dealers and lobster 
wharfs (NEFMC 2006). The four largest wholesalers market at least 56% of the total 
herring harvested, each accounting for roughly 20%, 14%, 13%, and 9%, respectively 
(Table 2). Bait wholesalers have vertically integrated their operations in a number of 
ways, including producing their own ice, generating their own power, owning trucks, and 
performing maintenance and repairs onsite. Within the largest wholesaler operations, 
very few components of bait processing are outsourced (NEFMC 2005). With such a 
concentrated and vertically integrated bait industry, the potential for wholesalers to 
exercise market power in the buying of raw herring and the selling of finished bait may 
potentially alter the predicted benefits of ITQ management. Although only aggregate 
data were available, average industry input and output prices suggest imperfect 
competition at the processor's level. Based on NEFMC reports, in 2003 the average 
price paid for raw herring was $.08 per pound (calculated as a weighted average using 
average monthly prices and monthly quantities), the lowest price being $.05 per pound 
for the month of July and the highest being $.16 per pound for the month of October 
(NEFMC 2004). The average price per pound of barreled bait in the same period 
(accounting for the weight in salt) is calculated at $.27 per pound (NEFMC 2005). It is 
reasonable to believe the processing costs associated with rinsing, salting, barreling, 
and shipping would likely not explain the 330% markup.  
 
Additionally, there is evidence of barriers preventing additional bait processors from 
entering the industry. First, as with many fisheries, Atlantic herring fishermen have long-
lasting, close-knit relationships with their buyers (Wilson 1980: Acheson 1981. 1985). 
Many vessels sell their entire annual harvests exclusively to a single dealer. This 
relationship instigated the development of the "days-out" agreement specified in the 
ASMFC's management plan, which limits the number of days fishing to five per week. 
The regulation was first implemented and enforced cooperatively by both fishermen and 
buyers to extend the fishing season to ensure stability of both the lobster and herring 
fishery. Over time the regulation has been codified into the state's management plan but 
is still monitored and enforced informally by both sectors of the industry. This strong and 
long-term relationship can prevent outsiders from seamlessly entering and establishing 
clientele in the bait processing sector. An additional hindrance to entry is the physical 
constraint of having only a limited number of fishing ports and associated space to build 
a processing plant. From 2000 to 2004, an average of 56% of total herring harvests has 
been landed at the same three ports (NEFMC 2006). These barriers, along with the 
evidence of a concentrated processing sector earning significant price markups, are 
suggestive of the existence of imperfect competition among bait dealers. 
 
In the next section we present a model of a fishery consisting of bait buyers, bait 
processors, and fishermen selling fish to be processed as bait. The model will then be 
used in Section IV to examine the welfare effects of implementing an ITQ system when 
bait processors have market power.  
 
 
III. The Model 
 
Consider a fishing industry comprised of three distinct sectors: herring fishermen, bait 
processors who act as middlemen in the purchase of raw herring and sale of herring 
bait, and lobstermen who are the final bait consumers. The single existing regulation in 
the herring fishery is a cap on aggregate harvest.  
 
There are F heterogeneous herring fishermen y = (1,2, ... F) in the industry, each 
harvesting a homogeneous fish product. Fishermen are assumed to behave perfectly 
competitively, taking input prices and output prices as given. Fishermen choose their 
level of fishing effort to maximize 
 
(1)     
 
where  is individual profit. is the harvesting production function determining the 
quantity of raw fish supplied to the bait dealers as a function of effort, ej is individual 
effort level (e.g., days fishing), W is the unit price paid to fishermen for their harvest, and 
cj is the variable cost of fishing as a function of an individual's effort. We assume 
concavity of the production function and convexity of the cost function, which requires 
, . Solving the first-order 
condition for the optimal level of effort eji W) and substituting this term into the 
harvesting production function yields a fisherman/s supply curve . 
 
The market supply schedule for raw fish (denoted by B) is the aggregation of the 
individual supply functions of the fishermen 
 
(2)     
 
and is subject to the constraint that market supply must not surpass the TAC that is. 
B(W) <= TAC. In other words, the supply function becomes vertical at the TAC. On the 
other side of the market, L perfectly competitive lobster fishermen (I = 1.2. ... L) 
purchase bait as an input into their production of lobster. Each is assumed to maximize 
 
(3)     
 
where ni is individual profit, k¡(f¡) is the quantity of lobster harvested and sold as a 
function of the quantity of bait purchased as an input. P is the unit price of bait, R is the 
output price of lobster, and V is a vector representing the cost of other inputs. Solving 
the first-order condition for the optimal quantity of bait yields an individual lobsterman's 
demand function for bait, which, when aggregated, forms the market demand function 
for bait 
 
(4)     
 
The middlemen sector consists of M processors (m = 1,2, ... M) transforming a single 
input—raw herring (b)—into a homogeneous output—herring bait (q). The production 
function for bait output is characterized by a fixed proportion technology, namely, 
, where alpha is the conversion factor between b, and q, g is a vector 
of other processing inputs, and h(•) may exhibit variable proportions. We include h( • ) to 
indicate that the other inputs, in contrast to raw herring, are not restricted to being used 
in fixed proportions. More specifically, we assume that raw herring is transformed into 
bait in a one-to-one relationship, that is, . With fixed proportions, 
the cost function of the processor is separable into input costs and processing costs. 
The firm-level cost function is , where C is the processing cost of bait 
and Y is the price vector of other inputs. Assuming further that there are constant 
returns to scale in processing, then  , where c(.) is the marginal 
processing cost. Thus, the profit function of a representative bait processor m is 
expressed as 
 
(5)     
 
where the notation for R, V, and Y is henceforth suppressed. The first-order condition of 
the profit-maximization problem with respect to  is 
 
(6)     
 
This expression states that profit is maximized at the quantity where the representative 
processor equates the marginal revenue from selling an additional unit of output, less 
the marginal processing cost, to the marginal outlay from purchasing an additional unit 
of input. The expression can be rewritten as 
 
(7)     
 
where is the market price elasticity of demand for bait (in absolute 
value) and  is the market price elasticity of supply for raw herring. 
The terms and  are the processors' 
conjectural variations in elasticity form for the final product and the raw input, 
respectively. The terms 0,,, and /.„, vary between zero (perfect competition) and one. 
When 0„, = 1. there is monopoly power or perfect collusion in the selling of bait, and 
when h,„ = 1, there is monopsony power or perfect collusion in the purchase of herring. 
We assume identical bait processors with identical production technologies producing 
homogeneous products. Thus, each firm's conjectural variation is identical in 
equilibrium, in other words,   (Schroeter 1988: 
Bresnahan 1989; Wann and Sexton 1992; Corts 1999). In this context, the industry 
equilibrium condition is 
 
(8)     
 
which in conjunction with the market supply equation [2] and the market demand 
equation [4] yields equilibrium values for P, W, and Q - B any set of parameters and 
values of the exogenous variables. 
 
 
IV. Welfare Analysis 
 
In this section we compare predicted changes in fishermen's surplus when in transition 
from open-access to individual property rights management. This comparison is 
performed for perfectly and imperfectly competitive processors. The one regulation in 
common between open-access and ITQ management is the existence of an 
exogenously determined TAC. Under ITQs fishermen are guaranteed a portion of the 
established TAC through their transferable quotas, and fishermen will buy or sell quota 
until each equates its marginal benefit from fishing to the market price for the ITQ 
(National Research Council 1999: Grafton et al. 2000; Grafton, Squires, and Fox 2000; 
Weninger 2002). Thus, in contrast to the overinvestment in capital, production 
inefficiencies, and overcrowding externalities resulting from open-access management, 
the long-run equilibrium under ITQs satisfies the condition for an efficient allocation 
of the resource (Matulich, Mittelhammer, and Reberte 1996). Furthermore, the literature 
on ITQs predicts a reduction in capital and marginal fishing costs as the less-efficient 
vessels exit the fishery (Weninger 2002; Squires 2003). We use these results from the 
literature to characterize the market effects of ITQ management. Therefore, the welfare 
analysis pertains to harvesters active in the long run after all welfare-improving trades 
have been made and does not consider welfare changes during the transition to ITQs. 
 
The ITQ-induced reduction in marginal fishing cost is captured in our model by a shift in 
the market supply curve for raw fish. The shift in market supply captures two 
fundamental effects of IT'Q management. It captures the reduction in production 
externalities realized when there is no longer a race to the fish, as well as the increase 
in fishing effort by the most-efficient vessels relative to the least-efficient vessels due to 
an exchange of quotas. Although it is well accepted that market supply will shift with 
efficiency gains in harvesting (e.g., Johnson and Libecap 1982),, there is continuous 
debate as to the nature of that supply shift, that is, whether the shift will take a pivotal or 
parallel form. A pivotal supply shift is represented by a reduction in the slope of market 
supply (clockwise rotation), while a parallel supply shift implies a lower supply intercept. 
Recognizing that the particular form of supply shift may have significant implications on 
welfare analyses, we follow Alston. Sexton, and Zhang (1999) and model the effect of 
both forms on fishermen's welfare. 
 
To proceed with the welfare analysis, we characterize the fishery by adopting the 
flexible functional forms for market supply and demand applied by Alston, Sexton, and 
Zhang (1999). Specifically, we denote 
 
(2a)     
 
and 
(4a)     
 
as the market supply (equation [2]) and the processor derived demand (equation [4]) lor 
herring, respectively. In these expressions, B is the quantity of raw fish supplied, W is 
the input price of raw fish. Q is the quantity of biiit demanded. /*is the output price of 
bait, and  are all positive parameters. These particular functional 
forms are useful because simple restrictions on parameter choices allow for 
investigation of a few special cases. Specifically, the market supply and demand 
functions take on linear forms when , square root forms when , 
and quadratic forms when . 
 
Although the Atlantic herring fishery is divided into four distinct management areas, we 
consider the impact from ITQ management only in the areas in which the TAC is 
presently binding, that is, area lA and area IB. Focusing our attention on these areas in 
which the TAC is binding is appropriate because a binding aggregate quota is a 
necessary condition for an ITQ system to induce efficiency gains through trade. We 
assume that fishermen do not move between areas because the ITQ system proposed 
by herring management under Amendment 1 allocates ITQs by specific fishing areas, 
Trade between herring management areas must be restricted because each area has 
different characteristics (e.g.. stock assessments and number of participants) that 
require different management strategies. Restricting trade between areas is common in 
other fisheries, as well, and is often motivated by sociopolitical concerns as in Iceland's 
extensive system of ITQs. 
 
Perfect Competition 
 
Under open-access management, the TAC is assumed to be set somewhere between 
zero and the equilibrium quantity that would be realized in the absence of a quantity 
restriction, that is. BTAC ^ [Ü. B,,,i]- where the subscript oa indicates open-access  
 
 
FIGURE 2 
Changes in Producer Surplus after the Transition from Open-Access to ITQ Management under Perfect 
Competition   
management. Under the assumption that the TAC is binding, along with . The 
equilibrium prices are determined by substituting BTAC into [2a] and [4a]. In other 
words, the price of herring is determined at the intersection of the derived demand and 
supply of herring, where the supply becomes vertical at the TAC. The derived demand 
for herring corresponds to the demand for bait shifted down by the constant marginal 
processing cost, c. The special case of linear supply and demand in which  is 
illustrated in Figure 2, which depicts the market for raw herring. 
 
In Figure 2, the solid lines represent market supply and derived demand under open-
access management (i.e.. before predicted efficiency gains are realized). The vertical 
quota line, TAC, indicates that total harvest is binding under open-access management 
at BTAC. With a perfectly competitive fishery, fishermen harvest BTAC at a marginal 
cost of Wi while selling their catch at a price of PTAC-> which is the bait price net of 
processing costs. Therefore, in Figure 2, producer surplus is represented by  , 
which includes the full quota rent (i.e., area ). Next we consider the ITQ-
induced pivotal and parallel shifts in turn. 
 
Pivotal supply shift. With the imposition of ITQs we model a pivotal shift in the market 
supply curve after ITQs as 
 
(2b)     
 
where 0 < t < 1. In Figure 2 the pivotal shift in market supply is represented by the 
dashed line W(B). With a binding quota, the aggregate harvest level remains fixed at ^r.-
ic after the shift in market supply. Thus, fishermen will sell the same quantity of herring 
for the same net price PJAC- but producer surplus has increased due to the increase in 
efficiency associated with ITQs. Producer surplus under ITQ management in this case 
is represented by area . 
 
In Figure 2, area AED represents the gain in producer surplus from an ITQ-driven 
outward pivot in market supply. The change in producer surplus can be expressed 
formally as 
 
(9)     
 
where the subscripts ITQ and oa indicate individual transferable quota and open-access 
management, respectively. The superscript V indicates a pivotal shift in market supply. 
Recall that 0 < í < 1, and therefore the change in producer surplus must be positive for 
any specification of p. Thus fishermen will strictly gain from the imposition of ITQs when 
the industry is perfectly competitive and the TAC is binding. Equation [9] shows that 
larger efficiency gains for herring fishermen (i.e.. lower t) result in larger gains in 
producer surplus from ITQ management.  
 
Parallel supply shift. Under this scenario, the effect of ITQ management is modeled as a 
reduction in the intercept of the market supply function for herring and is denoted as 
 
(2c)     
 
where z > 0. For the special linear case {p =  = I), [2c] is illustrated as W(B) in Figure 
2. As with the pivotal supply shift, because the TAC is binding before efficiency gains 
are realized, aggregate harvest again remains fixed at BTAC with the parallel shift in 
market supply. Thus, fishermen will sell the same quantity of herring for the same net 
price Ptac but producer surplus is now measured as AFCptac.  The change in producer 
surplus is expressed formally as 
 
(10)     
 
where the superscript l indicates a parallel shift in supply. Note that because r > 0, the 
change in producer surplus is strictly positive. Equation [10] shows that increases in 
efficiency (larger -) result in greater gains in producer surplus. In summary, under 
perfect competition fishermen are expected to strictly gain from ITQ management when 
efficiency gains trigger either pivotal or parallel shifts in supply. Further, the absolute 
size of the gain in producer surplus is a positive function of the level of efficiency (z or t). 
 
Imperfect Competition 
 
In this section we relax the assumption that the bait processing sector is perfectly 
competitive. In the absence of a binding quota, the market quantity of herring under 
imperfect competition would be determined where the processor's marginal revenue 
curve net of marginal processing costs {MR in Figure 3) intersects its marginal outlay 
curve {MO in Figure 3). However, because the TAC is binding in the fishery, the market 
quantity of herring, B¡IAC- falls somewhere between zero and the open-access level of 
harvest, B/,,,,, where throughout, the subscript i indicates values under imperfect 
competition. As Sexton and Zhang (1996) point out, with a perfectly inelastic supply 
curve the traditional industrial organization models to determine equilibrium prices under 
imperfect competition are not valid. That is, with a binding quota on harvest and an 
imperfectly competitive processing sector,  
 
 
FIGURE 3 
Changes in Producer Surplus after the Transition from Open-Access to ITQ Management under Imperfect 
Competition, Pivotal Supply Shift   
 
the division of fixed surplus between the processors and competitive herring fishermen 
remains undetermined. However, the herring price will be set somewhere between the 
perfectly competitive price (the price determined by the intersection of the derived 
demand and the vertical quota line) and the monopsony or perfectly collusive price (the 
price determined by the intersection of the supply and the vertical quota line). Where 
exactly in this range the price is set depends on the relative strength of processors and 
fishermen in determining the price (Oczkowski 1988, 1991, 1999; Gervais and 
Devadoss 2006).  
 
We specify the herring price as a linear combination of the perfectly competitive price, 
, and the monopsony price, , the quota level according to , 
which denotes the level of processors' strength in determining the price. Thus, the open-
access equilibrium net input price is denoted as . 
Note that,  can also be interpreted as the share of the quota rent captured by the 
processors, requiring that  . 
 
We expect that the lower the level of market power held by the processors (such as with 
a large number of processors), the further away the price of herring will be from 
. However, processors' strength in determining the price could also depend on 
other factors such as the level of information of processors relative to fishermen, the 
ability of processors to maintain tacit collusion, the availability of substitutes, and the 
exit costs of fishermen (Coff 1999). 
 
The special case of   = 1, illustrated in Figure 3, implies that processors capture the 
total quota rent in the fishery, that is, area   . In this case, the price paid to 
fishermen for raw herring is W. For all other cases in which  the quota rent will 
be divided between fishermen and processors. Note that for the example illustrated in 
Figure 3, producer surplus under open-access management is represented by area 
ADW. 
 
Pivotal supply shift. An ITQ-induced pivotal shift in the supply curve, in the absence of a 
quantity restraint, would result in an increase in the amount of herring sold and 
purchased on the market. However, because the TAC is assumed binding, the rotation 
in the supply curve caused by the implementation of ITQs simply causes a decrease in 
the minimum price fishermen are willing to accept for the same quantity of herring. In 
Figure 3, the new market supply is denoted as W(B), and the corresponding marginal 
outlay is denoted as MO. Assuming   still holds, the new herring producer surplus 
is represented by area AFW in the example illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
The corresponding change in producer surplus from the change in management is 
expressed formally as 
 
(11)     
 
Because (1 - t) > 0 and  > 0, whether fishermen gain from ITQs will depend on 
the sign of the first term in brackets in equation [11]. Note that this term will be positive, 
indicating a gain in fishermen's welfare, whenever   . In other words, 
fishermen gain when the strength of processors in determining price is relatively small. 
It is easy to verify that if  = 0, fishermen will strictly gain from the management change, 
whereas if   fishermen will strictly lose. The change in welfare in Figure 3 (when 
 and ) is the difference between the gain in producer surplus ACF, 
minus the corresponding loss . 
 
Therefore, when the TAC is binding under open-access management, fishermen gain 
from ITQ management if processors' strength in determining price is such that they 
capture no share of the quota rent and lose if processors capture the quota rent in its 
entirety. For any situation in between, whether fishermen gain depends on both the 
functional form of market supply and the share of the quota rent captured by the 
processors. For the three special cases of linear, square-root, and quadratic functional 
forms of supply, the levels of processors' bargaining strength that will allow fishermen to 
gain from ITQ management are , respectively. 
Therefore, the conditions necessary for fishermen to gain from ITQ management are 
least restrictive if market supply takes the square-root form and most restrictive under 
the quadratic form. 
 
Thus we find that when the processing sector is imperfectly competitive, it is possible for 
fishermen to suffer welfare losses from the imposition of transferable property rights 
management. Considering that previous welfare analyses, as well as this one, find that 
fishermen gain from ITQ management under perfect competition. 
 
FIGURE 4 
Changes in Producer Surplus after the Transition from Open-Access to ITQ Management under Imperfect 
Conditions, Parallel Supply Shift   
 
this is an important result. If efficiency gains from ITQs manifest themselves as a pivotal 
shift in supply, as is characterized in Johnson and Libecap (1982), fishermen may 
actually lose from the change in management, provided that processors have sufficient 
influence over the price of raw fish. Comparing equations [9] and [11] provides insight 
into evaluating ITQs in fisheries. Although in both perfect and imperfect competition 
larger efficiency gains (decreases in t) result in larger gains in fishermen's surplus, 
those gains are mitigated and potentially offset entirely by the degree of processors' 
strength in determining the price. Therefore, careful consideration of the market 
structure of the fishery, including the processing sector, is critical for prescribing good 
fisheries management policies. 
 
Parallel supply shift. To complete this section, we model the long-run effect of ITQ 
management as a parallel shift in market supply. Again, the harvest quantity remains 
fixed at BiTAC- and the share oï the quota rent captured by the processors is denoted 
by . To be consistent with our previous illustrations, Figure 4 illustrates the special 
case in which  . The new market supply and marginal outlay 
curves after ITQs are denoted by W(B) and MÔ, respectively. In Figure 4 the new 
measure of producer surplus is represented by ACW^. The change in producer surplus 
in this scenario is expressed formally as 
 
(12)     
 
When efficiency gains are modeled as a parallel shift in supply, fishermen will gain (at 
least weakly) from ITQ management. A comparison of equation [12] with equation [10] 
shows that although fishermen gain from ITQ management under a parallel supply shift 
regardless of the bargaining strength of processors with market power, the size of their 
gain under perfect competition will be strictly greater. Therefore, efficiency gains alone 
do not determine the gain to fishermen from ITQ management because these potential 
gains may be largely captured by the processors. 
 
To summarize, fishermen may actually suffer welfare losses from a pivotal supply shift 
when the processing sector is less than perfectly competitive. In the other three 
scenarios discussed, fishermen increase their welfare (at least weakly). However, in 
terms of absolute gains, imperfect competition within the bait processing sector plays a 
significant role even with a parallel shift in supply. Equation [12] demonstrates that the 
size of the gain in producer surplus from ITQs decreases with the processors' control 
over price. Therefore, the existence of market power in the processing sector is not 
innocuous, regardless of the nature of the supply shift. This result implies that it is 
important to consider the market structure of the processing sector and firms’ conduct 
when comparing various fisheries management policies using traditional cost-benefit 
analyses. 
 
 
V. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
 
Individual property rights management is often portrayed as the "silver bullet" to solving 
fisheries management problems. The literature on ITQs suggests two reasons for 
efficiency gains. First, fishermen with relatively high fishing costs will opt to sell their 
quotas and exit the fishery, while the remaining participants are able to fish the entire 
TAC at a lower total cost. Second, individual fishermen can shift to a lower cost of 
harvesting. Under open access with a TAC, fishermen race to catch a share of the fish, 
whereas under ITQs fishermen can catch their share of the TAC at their cost-minimizing 
rate. 
 
While much of the economic literature on ITQs focuses on gains in the aggregate, the 
fundamental policy debate revolves around the distribution of these gains among 
industry participants. Stylized models of ITQ management predict that fishermen, as a 
whole, will witness an increa.sc in welfare resulting from the management change 
(Terrebonne 1995). However, these efficiency and welfare gains have been derived 
relying on the assumption of a perfectly competitive industry. In many fisheries, and in 
particular the Atlantic herring fishery, certain sectors of the industry show evidence of 
imperfectly competitive behavior. Therefore an important question remains concerning 
the impact of middlemen's market power on fishermen's welfare. This paper specifically 
addressed how fishermen's welfare changes in the long run after it converts from open-
access to ITQ management in the presence of an imperfectly competitive processing 
sector. While the circumstances in the Atlantic herring fishery motivated this analysis, its 
implications are relevant to all fisheries with similar market characteristics. 
  
Although the Atlantic herring fishery is divided into four management areas, we focused 
our analysis on the popular inshore areas lA and IB in which the TAC is generally 
binding. We explore the welfare gains to fishermen under both a perfectly and 
imperfectly competitive processing sector, and allow for efficiency gains to take either 
the form of a pivotal or parallel shift. The principal result of our study is that although 
efficiency increases from ITQs can generate welfare gains for fisher men under perfect 
competition, these gains are reduced and potentially completely offset by an imperfectly 
processing sector. With both parallel and pivotal shifts in supply, the magnitude of the 
welfare loss relative to open-access management increases with respect to the 
processor's strength in setting the price of bait. Moreover, in the case of a pivotal supply 
shift, fishermen may suffer an absolute loss in welfare relative to open-access 
management. The predicted increases in efficiency attainable through tradable property 
rights management are therefore incomplete measures of regulatory impacts because 
the imperfect competition in the processing sector can appropriate welfare gains. 
 
A touchstone in the policy debate over individual tradable quotas in fisheries is the 
distribution of the gains and losses over participants from a rationalization of the fishery. 
This analysis demonstrates that while there may be efficiency gains from tradable 
property rights management, those gains are incomplete measures of regulatory 
impacts if the processing sector is imperfectly competitive. Under imperfect competition 
some of the efficiency gains are appropriated away from the harvesting sector. Thus, 
careful consideration of the market structure of the fishery is important regardless of the 
nature of the supply shift when comparing management options using traditional cost-
benefit analyses. 
 
There are three critical implications for renewable resource management that stem from 
this research. First, evaluations of ITQs need to incorporate the processing sector and 
explicitly consider market imperfections. Second, aggregate changes in efficiency or 
capacity utilization are not a sufficient measure of the distribution of gains from ITQ 
management. Third, if achieving welfare gains for fishermen is a fundamental 
management objective, relying on a policy of individual property rights is unlikely to 
generate the desired outcome under the presence of powerful market intermediaries. 
Thus, policy makers concerned with these imperfections should explore mechanisms to 
improve fishermen's bargaining position relative to processors by leveraging legislation 
such as the Fishermen's Collective Marketing Act of 1934. 
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